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Websites are normally immune to suits arising from 
illegal user-posted content due to 42 USC § 230. Victims of 
illegal postings must therefore bring suit, if at all, against the 
original posters. However, when websites refuse to take down 
illegal content, a suit against an original poster might not 
provide relief. In the recent case Blockowicz v. Williams, a 
family won a default judgment against persons posting 
defamatory content to Ripoff Report. But the plaintiffs could 
not contact the defendant to enforce the judgment, and thus 
they sought enforcement of an injunction against Ripoff 
Report. The court refused because Ripoff Report was not a 
party to the action. As a result, the top Google hit for the 
Blockowicz family name remains a defamatory posting. This 
Article considers how the traditional exceptions to the rule 
that injunctions do not bind nonparties apply in the context of 
the relationship between a poster and a website and when, if 
ever, a nonparty website might be bound by an injunction 
against a poster. This Article also discusses alternative 
remedies plaintiffs can seek if they are unable to obtain an 
injunction against a nonparty website. 
 
  
                                                                                                             
*Connor Moran, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2011. 
Thank you to Professor Jane Winn and student editors Stephanie Holmes and 
Gareth Lacy for their assistance with this Article. 
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The Blockowicz family faced a problem both new and ancient: 
someone with ill intent wrote negative public statements about them. 
The person wrote, among other things, that one of the family’s 
daughters was a prostitute. These statements were published in a 
prominent place, a website entitled Ripoffreport.com (Ripoff Report), 
making the post the top Google hit for the Blockowicz name. Despite 
a default judgment against the poster that the communications were 
defamatory, the Blockowicz family has yet to succeed in having the 
statements removed from the website. 
This result occurred because of 47 U.S.C. § 2301 and the 
longstanding doctrine that injunctions may not be directed to 
nonparties to litigation. Section 230 provides, in part, that no website 
or Internet service provider may be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any material provided by a third party for the purpose of any 
lawsuit.2 This provision insulates Web providers from liability for 
illegal third-party communications made on their sites. This 
protection is most frequently associated with defamation claims.3 
Victims of online defamation can ordinarily only sue original posters 
rather than websites that contain defamation. 
However, if a post remains in the control of the website operator, 
an injunction directed to the poster may not provide relief. Under 
                                                                                                             
1  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
2  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
3  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, injunctions may bind only parties 
to a suit, persons legally identified with them (such as agents), and 
persons acting in active concert or participation.4 Section 230 
prohibits plaintiffs from naming website operators as parties; such 
operators cannot be bound by injunctions unless they are legally 
identified with or in active concert or participation with the original 
poster. 
This Article describes the Blockowicz case, examines the general 
prohibition against forcing nonparties to comply with injunctions and 
the traditional exceptions to that prohibition, and considers the 
possibility that plaintiffs may obtain relief using the legal remedy of 
garnishment. 
 
I. BLOCKOWICZ V. WILLIAMS 
 
The Blockowicz v. Williams case involved the website 
Ripoffreport.com, which allows users to post complaints.5 Ripoff 
Report’s policy is to never take down any complaint.6 When posting 
materials, persons agree to terms of service including that: “By 
posting information on ROR, you understand and agree that the 
material will not be removed even at your request.”7 Williams posted 
to Ripoff Report regarding the Blockowicz family, alleging among 
other things that one of the family’s daughters is a prostitute.8 As of 
May 2011, this post was the top Google hit for the name 
“Blockowicz.”  
In 2009, the Blockowiczs filed a defamation suit against Joseph 
David Williams and Michelle Ramey.9 The defendants defaulted and 
                                                                                                             
4  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). 
5  See Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 565 (7th Cir. 2010); RIPOFF 
REPORT, http://www.ripoffreport.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
6  Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 565 (7th Cir. 2010). 
7  Id. 
8  “Report: Megan Blockowicz, Mary Blockowicz, David J. Blockowicz, 
Brendon Blockowicz, Lisa Blockowicz,” http://www.ripoffreport.com/ 
Prostitutes/Megan-Blockowicz-Mar/megan-blockowicz-mary-blockow-47e98.htm 
(Friday, October 31, 2003). Although the original report remains accessible, it is 
now supplemented with a statement of ripoffreport.com’s position regarding the 
case and a caution that a court order found the statements not to be true. 
9 Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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the court granted a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to 
remove defamatory postings from websites.10 The injunction also 
provided that the Blockowiczs’ counsel could directly contact third-
party Web hosts and ask them to delete the postings.11 Websites such 
as Facebook.com, Myspace.com, and complaintsboard.com took 
down the postings.12 Ripoff Report, unlike other website operators, 
refused to remove the postings. The Blockowiczs sought to enforce 
the injunction against Ripoff Report, which challenged enforcement 
on the basis that Ripoff Report was not a party to the lawsuit.13 
The Blockowiczs argued that Ripoff Report acted in concert with 
Williams by entering into the terms-of-service agreement promising 
not to remove any posted material even in the face of an injunction.14 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to find that the terms of 
service represented an agreement to aid and abet the evasion of an 
injunction.15 The court pointed out that the terms explicitly forbid the 
posting of defamatory content.16 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that an action with 
knowledge of an injunction that aids and abets the evasion of an 
injunction must occur after the injunction.17 The court asserted that 
the only relevant action of Ripoff Report was entering into the terms-
of-service agreement, which occurred before the injunction.18 
Therefore, this action could not qualify as aiding and abetting. 
As a result of this ruling, the Blockowicz family has no apparent 
recourse to remove defamatory postings. In this case the postings 
were ruled defamatory in a default judgment proceeding, so the 
precise facts of the case were never argued in court. However, the 
doctrinal result would be the same whether the underlying injunction 
resulted from a default judgment or a judgment after a full trial on the 
                                                                                                             
10 Id. at 656. 
11 Blockowicz v. Williams, 675 F.Supp. 2d 912, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
12 Id. at 914-15. 
13 Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2010). See 
Blockowicz v. Williams 675 F.Supp. 2d 912, 914 (N.D. Ill., 2009). 
14 Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 567-68 (7th Cir. 2010). 
15 Blockowicz v. Williams, 675 F.Supp. 2d 912, 915-16 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
16 Id. at 916. 
17 Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2010). 
18 Id. 
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merits against the poster.19 
 
II. THE GENERAL RULE: INJUNCTIONS DO NOT BIND NONPARTIES 
 
The result in Blockowicz stems from the general rule that courts 
do not direct injunctions to persons who are not parties to litigation.20 
When rigid application of this rule allowed parties to evade 
injunctions, courts traditionally developed common-law exceptions.21 
For example, courts enforced injunctions against the agents of parties 
and people aiding or abetting parties in violating injunctions.22 Based 
on these common-law exceptions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 codified two 
categories of nonparties bound by injunctions: those in active concert 
or participation with them and those legally identified with the 
parties. 
 
A.  Active Concert or Participation 
 
A website may be subject to an injunction on the basis that it is in 
“active concert or participation” with the user.23 In order to be subject 
to an injunction under this prong, the defendant (Williams in the 
Blockowicz case) must be violating the injunction and the nonparty 
(Ripoff Report) must be in some way working with that party.24 This 
exception first appeared in Seaward v. Patterson, where a lessor was 
                                                                                                             
19 See Ben Sheffner, Court: ‘No recourse’ for victims of defamatory postings 
under Section 230, COPYRIGHTS & CAMPAIGNS (Dec. 22, 2009, 8:36 PM), 
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com. The Blockowicz family never had the 
option of a trial on the merits. Williams, the original defendant, did not appear. A 
trial on the merits against Ripoff Report would be precluded by § 230. 
20 This rule was repeatedly stated by courts of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Note, Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. REV. 719, 
719 (1965) (citing Iveson v. Harris, (1802) 82 Eng. Rep. 102 (Ch.); 7 Ves. 251; 
Gadd v. Worral, (1795) 145 Eng. Rep. 965 (Exch.); 2 Anstr. 555; Dawson v. 
Princeps, (1795) 145 Eng. Rep. 954 (Ex.); 2 Anstr. 521). 
21 See, e.g., Wellesley v. Mornington, (1848) 50 Eng. Rep. 786 (Ch.); 11 
Beavan 181. 
22 Id. 
23 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). 
24 United Pharm. Corp. v. United States, 306 F.2d 515, 517-18 (1st Cir. 1962), 
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 372, 374-75 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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granted an injunction against a lessee forbidding him from holding a 
boxing match.25 Notwithstanding this injunction, the lessee worked 
together with a third party to put on the boxing match.26 Because the 
third party knew of the injunction and helped the lessee violate it, he 
was subject to contempt prosecution even if not an agent.27 A 
defamation plaintiff attempting to bind a website could argue that the 
website acted similarly to the nonagent third party and is therefore 
bound by the injunction. 
The active concert or participation exception appeared in one case 
related to telecommunications services.28 In the case of South Central 
Bell Telephone Company v. Constant, Inc., a moving company was 
subject to a trademark injunction preventing it from using the name 
“Atlas.”29 Prior to the injunction, South Central Bell distributed its 
telephone book with the moving company’s name listed as Atlas.30 
The plaintiff in the trademark case learned that the moving company 
was still answering its phone as “Atlas” in violation of the injunction 
and contacted South Central Bell.31 The telephone company 
established an intercept wherein an operator would ask persons 
placing calls to the moving company’s number who they intended to 
call.32 Those that said “Atlas” were redirected to a company 
authorized to use that name.33 
The moving company sued South Central Bell, seeking an 
injunction prohibiting the company from using this intercept.34 South 
Central Bell argued that the injunction bound it to make use of its 
technological capacity.35 The court agreed, stating, “[a]s soon as 
South Central Bell was apprised of the fact that its subscriber, 
Constant, was, by use of South Central Bell’s equipment, violating 
                                                                                                             
25 [1897] 1 Ch. 545, 545-47. 
26 Id.. 
27 Id at 549. 
28 S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Constant, Inc., 304 F. Supp 732, 733-34 (E.D. La. 
1969), aff’d, 437 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971). 






35 Id. at 734-735. 
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the injunction imposed by this Court, it had a duty not to act in any 
way in concert with Constant to effectuate or perpetuate the 
violation.”36 
This language raises the possibility that a website that knowingly 
allows its equipment to be used in violation of an injunction might be 
considered to be acting in concert with the poster. The importance of 
this language might be limited, however, by the fact that the South 
Central Bell case arose in the unique situation where the 
telecommunications provider took the initiative to uphold the 
injunction and defended a suit arising from that activity. No court 
appears to have applied the South Central Bell rationale to enforce an 
injunction. 
The general conception of a telephone service as a common 
carrier indiscriminately acting as a conduit for others’ speech argues 
against the application of such an injunction.37 On the other hand, a 
court that was particularly troubled by a case where a defamed party 
would otherwise be left without remedy could potentially make use of 
the broad language in South Central Bell as a basis to hold that a 
website that knowingly allowed defamatory content to continue being 
disseminated using its equipment acted in concert with a party 
defendant and could therefore be enjoined. 
 
B.  Legally Identified 
 
The legal identification exception to the rule that injunctions must 
be directed solely to parties states that a person acting as an officer, 
agent, servant, employee, or attorney for an enjoined party can also 
be subject to an injunction.38 A website could not act as an officer or 
attorney. However, it is conceivable that a website could act as an 
agent for a third-party poster. 
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person 
(a “principal”) agrees the agent will act on the principal’s behalf and 
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent agrees to do so.39 A 
website may in theory act as agent for a Web user. When a user 
                                                                                                             
36 Id. at 736. 
37 See 1 ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW 210 (West 1999). 
38 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). 
39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
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contracts with the website in order to make a sales listing or post 
information, the website arguably acts on the behalf of the user by 
providing information to other people. The level of control exerted 
over the interaction by the site user varies, but it may rise to a level at 
which a court could find an agency relationship. 
There is one important qualification to the agency relationship in 
the website context: a person must be acting as an agent at the time of 
an alleged breach of an injunction.40 That means that the website 
must still be subject to the user’s control at the time of the injunction. 
In a situation where the user’s control over posted content ceases as 
soon as the content is posted, the agency relationship likely ends at 
the same time. For example, in the Blockowicz situation, the poster 
gave up all control over the posting to Ripoff Report at the time of 
posting. Even if a court were to find that Ripoff Report acted as an 
agent at the time the posting occurred, the website would no longer 
be an agent at the time of the injunction and would not be bound. 
Even given this limitation, it is plausible that a court may find a 
website continues to act as an agent for a party who posted content as 
long as the poster retains the ability to edit or remove content. When 
a user retains authority to tell a website to remove illegal content but 
refuses to do so, it is possible that a website might be subject to an 
injunction. 
 
III. BEYOND INJUNCTIONS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GARNISHMENT  
AS A REMEDY 
 
Given that Blockowicz does not neatly match either exception that 
allows injunctions to bind nonparties, persons in the situation of the 
Blockowiczs may need to seek other remedies. One possibility is a 
garnishment proceeding. Garnishment allows a plaintiff to make a 
claim on property of a defendant held by a third party known as a 
garnishee.41 A person attempting to take down a defamatory or 
otherwise illegal Web posting would argue that the posting is a form 
of property owned by the defendant and therefore the third party 
                                                                                                             
40 See Regal Knitware Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945) (“[W]hether one 
brings himself in contempt as a ‘successor or assign’ depends on an appraisal of his 
relations.”). 
41 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 1 (2008). 
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website may be compelled to “turn over” the property.  
State statutes create and control garnishment.42 Garnishment 
ordinarily extends to both tangible and intangible personal property.43 
In order to gain a garnishment remedy, a plaintiff in the situation of 
the Blockowiczs would argue that the posting constitutes intangible 
personal property. The most obvious form this argument could take 
would be one based on the copyright in the posting. 
In a garnishment suit, the plaintiff steps into the shoes of the 
defendant and has only those rights to the property held by the 
garnishee that the defendant would have.44 In the Blockowicz case, 
this would mean that if the Blockowiczs were able to treat the posting 
as property for garnishment purposes, they would be able to take only 
those rights in relationship to the posting that the original poster 
could take. The nature of the Ripoff Report terms of service would 
thus provide a second hurdle in the Blockowicz case itself, given that 
posters grant “an irrevocable, perpetual, fully-paid, worldwide 
exclusive license to use, copy, perform, display and distribute such 
information and content” to the website.45  
In order to get an order to take down the post in a garnishment 
proceeding, a party in the Blockowicz situation would have to 
overcome the contract granting the license to distribute the posting as 
well as the contract provisions providing that the posting will not be 
taken down even on request of the poster. A plaintiff could argue as a 
matter of contract law that the contract itself was illegal or in 
violation of public policy.46 A plaintiff could also argue that a 
                                                                                                             
42 See id. § 2. 
43 Id. § 110. 
44 Id. § 211. 
45 Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 565 (7th Cir. 2010). 
46 In this context, the fact that the contract itself forbids the posting of 
defamatory content might argue against a finding of illegality. That the posting of 
defamatory content is prohibited by the terms of service agreement is of little help 
to a person in the situation of the Blockowiczs. This contract would potentially 
allow Ripoff Reports to sue the original poster for damages resulting from the 
defamatory posting, but gives no powers to the Blockowiczs, who are not parties to 
the terms of service contract. See Blockowicz v. Williams. 630 F.3d 563, 568-569 
(7th Cir. 2010) (Ripoff Report’s refusal to remove defamatory posting does not 
render terms of service agreement not to post defamatory information illusory 
because the agreement allows Ripoff Report to seek compensation from poster). 
9
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contract is unconscionable in demanding on a take-it-or-leave-it basis 
that all rights to information be turned over. If the parties attempting 
to take down information are successful in overturning the contract 
granting license to display the post and forbidding content removal, 
they would presumably be able to use garnishment to step into the 
shoes of the defendant and compel a takedown. 
Because of the dual hurdles of showing that the posting qualifies 
as property of the poster and demonstrating that the poster would 
have the right to take down the posting, garnishment would be a 
difficult means to avoid the problem created by the interaction of  
§ 230 and the rule limiting injunctions to parties. This method would 




Blockowicz illustrates the difficulty a plaintiff faces in forcing a 
recalcitrant website to remove third-party content. Given the apparent 
injustice of the result, which leaves victims of illegal postings without 
recourse, it seems other courts may stretch existing legal doctrines to 
reach an opposite result. A court may find that a web provider that 
knowingly allows use of its equipment in a way that violates an 
injunction is in active concert or participation and may be bound. If a 
website acts on the behalf of the user and under some level of user 
control after the time that an injunction is issued, it is plausible that a 
court could find that the website acted as an agent and is subject to an 
injunction because it is legally identified with the defendant. A 
plaintiff might also convince a court to issue a writ of garnishment to 
compel the site to turn over the post. In order to do so, however, the 
plaintiff would also have to convince a court that any terms-of-
service agreement that abridges the right of a poster to take down 





 Most websites take down content that is subject to a court  
order. Although a website that is not a party to an action  
is probably not subject to an injunction arising from that  
action, voluntarily taking down content eliminates any possibility 
10
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss1/5
2011] INJUNCTION RELIEF 57 
of contempt liability. 
 Determine whether the website took any action regarding the 
posting after the court issued its injunction. Such contact may 
allow the court to enjoin the nonparty website based on “active 
concert or participation.” 
 Determine whether the poster of the content retains any authority 
to alter or control the defamatory content. If so, the website could 
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